ROOM
36
Space Security
space-related technology was principally directed
towards military objectives.
The relationship between space activities and
military conduct had always existed in practical
terms, irrespective of the rules that had been
developed. It became self-evident to military
commanders that space technology could be
utilised to create an ‘integrated battle platform’ to
aid in the implementation of military strategy.
This embeddedness of space technology and
warfare has ratcheted up considerably since those
early days. It was during the Gulf War in 1990 that
the military value of space assets for the conduct
of warfare was first used to a significant degree.
‘Operation Desert Storm’ is now often referred to
as the ‘first space war’.
The militarisation of space is therefore a given,
notwithstanding that many regard this as flying
in the face of the Outer Space Treaty. The ‘non-
military versus non-aggressive’ debate regarding
the ‘peaceful purposes’ doctrine in its Article IV
is a long-redundant argument in practical terms,
and the role that international law can play now
centres on the risks and uncertainties associated
with the trending ‘weaponisation’ of space.
Following the terrorists’ attacks of 11 September
2001 in New York, the US government embarked
on a policy designed to enhance its domination of
the space dimension of military operations. This
necessitated having the ability to protect critical
infrastructure and assets in outer space.
Subsequently, although the Obama
administration emphasised co-operation in space
to a far greater degree, hawkish sentiments still
appeared to guide US space policy. It is so far
unclear how the Trump administration will direct
military policy in this regard but initial rhetoric
suggests an even greater engagement with military
activities involving space.
Other space powers are engaged in similar
activities directed towards maximising the
strategic (and potential military) advantages to be
gained through space-related technology and we
appear to be locked into a true ‘space arms race’. It
is within the realms of reality that outer space may
itself become an emerging theatre of warfare.
The situation is complicated further by the
increasing prevalence of ‘dual-use’ satellites and a
growing reliance by States on continuous and reliable
access to privately operated commercial satellites for
the protection of their national security interests.
This means any attempt to apply the
jus in
bello
principles to a ‘space war’ is fraught with
complexity, challenging the overly simplistic
assumptions that are often made by commentators
when seeking to apply ‘terrestrial’ international
law principles to an outer space paradigm.
A carefully thought-out
sui generis
system
of global space governance is required to
meet modern-day challenges. The deliberate
destruction by both China (2007) and the US
(2008) of their own satellites highlighted the
dangers posed and the fact that neither country
felt constrained by existing space law, or by other
principles of international law, further emphasises
the need to develop more rigorous international
rules to protect the space environment.
It is too easy for States not to abide by the terms
of voluntary non-binding instruments
Existing international
legal regimes are not
designed to cope with a
rising number of cubesats
flying in loose formation
some 500 km above Earth
- a more institutional form
of space traffic
management might now
be required.
